is permitted in self-defense. Specifically, Article 51 of the
Charter allows force to be used in self-defense "if an armed
attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations ...."
[Emphasis added.] The issue then is whether the use of a computer virus equate to an "armed" attack within the meaning of
Article 51.
This is a good illustration of where technology is, perhaps,
ahead of international law. Although computer viruses can wreak
havoc on advanced societies like that of the United States, such
"attacks" - at least the economically-oriented one described in
this scenario - do not as yet equate to an "armed" attack within
the meaning of the UN Charter. As a general rule, "armed"
attacks justifying an Article 51 response are largely limited to a
significant assault using traditional kinds of weapons.
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"The markets were deliberately taken down by a systematic
and highly skillful attack" said George Winston, a character in Tom Clancy's recent novel Debt of Honor. The "attack,"
however, was not one of bombs or bullets, it was much more
subtle: a computer virus corrupts the New York Stock Exchange's
electronic records and millions of transactions are wiped out. But
as in every Clancy novel, clever people devise ingenious ways to
counteract the assault. Of course the good guys win in the end.
Life can and does imitate art from time to time but often
without the happy ending. American commerce and government
is dependent upon millions of computers, most of which are
vulnerable to cybersubversion.
With computers internationally linked by a bewildering
number of cross-connections, tracking down a computer-attacker
can be a profoundly difficult task. Suppose, however, that the
source of the techno-assault against the Stock Exchange is
definitively identified as emanating from the headquarters of the
intelligence service of a hostile foreign government. Moreover,
suppose the hostile government claims responsibility and threatens further cyber-assaults if its demands are not met. Can the
U.S., consonant with the United Nations Charter, launch a bevy
of smart bombs or cruise missiles against the offending facility?
The answer is hardly a resounding "yes," and more likely a
qualified "no." The adoption of the UN Charter in 1945 had the
effect of rendering obsolete traditional notions of "acts of war."
The Charter was designed to eliminate the threat or use of force
from international affairs. For example, under Article 2(3) of the
Charter the signatories have agreed to settle their disputes including many that might have once been considered "acts of
war" - by "peaceful means." Similarly, Article 2(4) requires all
members to "refrain in their international relations from the threat
or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state ...."
The Charter does, however, allow signatories to use force in
certain limited circumstances. In addition to actions specifically
authorized by the Security Council, unilateral use of armed force

18

NCSANews

In the 1986 decision in Nicaragua v. United States, for
example, the International Court of Justice concluded that
Nicaragua's support for rebels in various Central American
countries did not justify the "armed" response (i.e., mining
Nicaraguan harbors and other covert actions) by the United
States.
Further support for the proposition that an "armed" attack
warranting an Article 51 response does not include cyberassaults
can be found by examining the Charter as a whole. In its outline
of actions to be taken against recalcitrant nations, it seems to
distinguish between acts constituting "armed" operations and
lesser coercive maneuvers. Article 41, for example, discusses
"measures not involving the use of armed force" and cites as
examples the "complete or partial interruption of economic
relations and of rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio, and other
means of communication ...." [Emphasis added.]
Analogizing such tactics to a computer virus assault that
causes a "complete" or "partial interruption" of the electronic
communication of economic information is not difficult. Thus, it
appears that the use of a computer virus probably does not per se
constitute an "armed" attack under the Charter and Article 51
would not justify the proposed military strikes. Indeed, such
military action, notwithstanding the virus invasion, might
constitute "aggression" - a serious allegation in the postNuremberg world.
Some scholars argue, however, that the true meaning of
"armed attack" under Article 51 relates to the "intensity of the
coercion" imposed. Thus, it might be argued that where the
economic damage caused by the electronic attack is of sufficient
scale and scope, then the coercion equates to "armed attack"
justifying an Article 51 response.
This argument is somewhat stronger, however, if the nature
of the cyberattack was different, e.g., if a computer virus let loose
by the hostile nation infected all kinds of computer systems, not
just economic ones like the stock exchange. If, for example, a
virus destroyed the computer controlling the power grid or the
telephone system serving a major urban area, hundreds if not
thousands of innocent civilians could die (e.g., elderly people
could freeze to death, emergency 911 calls would be blocked,
etc.).
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Under such circumstances, clear evidence of reasonably
foreseeable deaths directly attributable to the "attack," it might be
possible to equate a computer virus assault with an "armed"
attack as used in Article 51. Indeed, most experts would agree
that where data manipulation directly results in significant
destructive effects that are indistinguishable in any meaningful
way from those caused by traditional (kinetic) weapons, such
assaults constitute "armed attacks" for purposes of Article 51.
Even if the particular action does not warrant a military
response under Article 51, this does not mean that the United
States would be without recourse. Domestic criminal law may
apply, and the U.S. could take the matter to the Security Council
or other international fora for resolution. The Security Council
could authorize military force against offending state even in the
absence of an "armed attack." The requirement for an "armed
attack" applies only to the authority to engage in self-defense
pursuant to Article 51.
Furthermore, just because a particular cyberassault does not
authorize a military strike does not mean it is legal under international law. A whole range of international agreements may be
violated. The doctrine of state responsibility holds that every
breach of international law creates a duty to pay for any loss or
damage that results.
Moreover, an important new study by Commander James N.
Bond of the Naval War College asserts that victims of an unlawful
cyberattack that does not amount to a use of force may take
proportional countermeasures that also do not amount to a use of
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"force." He maintains that one such response might be a "tit-fortat" data manipulation.
All of this suggests a need to establish an international
consensus as to the meaning and consequences of cyberattacks.
One obvious method of qualifying cyberassaults as "armed
attacks" is to simply define electronic methodologies as "weapons." In this respect a 1974 UN resolution defined the "use of
any weapons by a State against the territory of another State" as
"aggression." The United States, however, should approach such
proposals with caution. They may result in unintended limitations when applied to the range of emerging new technologies.
While the U.S. has many vulnerabilities to cyberassault, it also
has great potential capability.
Nevertheless, as the world becomes more cybernetically
dependent, real lives become at risk in the 'virtual' environment.
Moreover, corrupting the vast databases of industry the Federal
government can easily do as much damage as the physical
destruction that dozens of enemy bombers could wreak. The
United States needs to be able to deter the specter of such assaults
by all means at its disposal - including traditional military
strikes.
Colonel Dunlap is Staff Judge Advocate of United States
Strategic Command. He has a B.A. from St. Joseph's University
(PA) and a J.D. from Villanovoa University School of Law. He is a
Distinguished Graduate of the National War College. All views and
opinions he expresses are his alone and not necessarily those of the
Department of Defense or any of its components.
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